The Problem of the Pragmatic Justification of Beliefs
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Abstract
In this paper, I discuss the problem of whether beliefs can be justified pragmatically, i.e. by giving practical reasons to hold them. First, I consider two competing stances in contemporary epistemology, i.e. epistemological purism and epistemological pragmatism. Epistemological purism insists that only truth-related factors can justify beliefs, while epistemological pragmatism acknowledges that pragmatic factors can make the epistemic difference along with the truth-related ones. Second, I present the argument for epistemic purism based on the distinction between attitude and content of belief. Given the arguments earlier in the paper, I conclude that epistemic purism is the more preferable stance to take than epistemological pragmatism.
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